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Abstract
I propose a twofold classification of the main considerations underlying the choice
of an election procedure: political criteria on the one hand, and social-choice
criteria on the other. I formulate political dichotomies, each combination of which
narrows down the choice of procedure to a sub-class of the class of all procedures.
I discuss what social-choice theory has to offer in each of these.
1 Introduction
My aim in this brief paper is modest: not to present new findings, but to propose
what I regard as a useful way of classifying voting procedures, and thus organiz-
ing the way we look at them. My main thesis is that we have to make a strict
distinction between two kinds of consideration in choosing a voting/election pro-
cedure:
• Political criteria. I use this rubric in a very broad sense, including criteria
ranging from the pragmatic to the philosophical. But all of them are purely
a matter of opinion, not of “right” or “wrong”.
• Social-choice considerations. I take this rubric in the narrow sense: the
logico-mathematical properties of a voting procedure, the pathologies and
paradoxes that afflict it.
These two kinds of consideration are not on a par with each other: political con-
siderations are paramount in choosing a voting procedure. For example, as far as
political elections are concerned, it is politicians who usually choose the voting
procedure; and even when the choice is made by referendum, the question put to
referendum is framed by politicians. But politicians and their advisors – and, ide-
ally, the general public – ought to be aware of the logico-mathematical properties
of the voting procedures in question; otherwise they can easily walk into a trap.
So it is wrong to dismiss these matters as of interest only to geeks.
On the other hand, social-choice theorists must recognize that their profes-
sional scientific role is confined to ascertaining the technical properties of vot-
ing procedures, including the likelihood of various pathologies manifesting them-
selves under each procedure. However, the decision as to which pathology (with
a given likelihood) is more tolerable than another is not a scientific matter; it is
political. On this, the opinion of a social-choice theorist is not more privileged
than that of any well-informed member of the public.
Similarly, social-choice theory provides information about the effects of a
given system of electing a legislature regarding the stability of a parliamentary
government and the number of parties with realistic prospect of winning seats
(Duverger’s law). However, the question as to the importance of a stable govern-
ment (and the desirable degree of stability), or the desirability of a small or large
number of such parties is a purely political one.
In what follows, I will formulate two main political dichotomies, each offering
two alternatives. This gives rise to a fourfold political classification of voting
procedures. I will explore what social choice theory has to offer in each of these
four classes.
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2 Two dichotomies
The first main dichotomy is relevant for electing a representative assembly such
as a legislature, not a holder of an individual post, such as a president. I state it as
follows:
i. Proportional Representation (PR) v District Representation (DR)
This dichotomy hinges on a distinction between two quite different senses of the
verb represent and its derivatives. Who or what is being “representative”, and
whom or what are they supposed to “represent”?
One sense of this term – which underlies PR – is intended, for example, in
statistics, when we speak of a representative sample. An elected assembly is
representative in this sense if it is a microcosm of the entire electorate, reflecting in
true proportion (or as near to it as possible) the various shades of opinion that exist
in the society as a whole. Thus it can stand as proxy for a market-place meeting
of the entire citizenry; and a vote taken in the assembly may be regarded as a
close approximation to a referendum. Here a member of the assembly does not
represent a geographically defined constituency, but reflects a like-minded section
of the electorate at large, which may well be geographically dispersed. Note that
being representative in this sense is primarily an attribute of the assembly as a
body, not so much of each individual member: in order to ascertain whether the
assembly is indeed representative, we must examine it as a whole.
Another, quite different sense of the term – which underlies DR – is similar to
the one intended when we speak of a diplomatic representative of a country. Note
that being a representative in this sense is an attribute of the individual member:
an assembly is representative only inasmuch as it is an assembly of represen-
tatives. The relationship between a representative in this sense and what s/he
represents is like that between agent and principal.1 Here every member of the
assembly is personally elected for representing a particular constituency, which is
defined geographically. Accordingly, there are a large number of constituencies,
each of which elects a single representative or a small number – at most a handful
– of representatives. Naturally, such a constituency may be, and normally is in
fact, quite heterogeneous: its voters may differ considerably from one another in
their interests, preferences, tastes and opinions. The presumed aim of a DR pro-
cedure is to elect a candidate (or a small set of candidates) that is in some sense
“best” or “most suitable” for representing this heterogeneous constituency.
Although the distinction between these two senses of representation is quite
fundamental, I have not seen it clearly and explicitly articulated in the social-
choice literature. Perhaps this is due to my ignorance; and I stand to be corrected.
1I owe this observation to Iain McLean (oral communication).
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At any rate, the distinction is very often ignored and the two senses are conflated.2
However, there are some well-known “compromise” systems that blend both
types of representation. One such compromise is the so-called Additional Member
system used, for example, in elections to the German Bundestag and the Scottish
Assembly, whereby some members of the legislature are elected by a DR method,
and the rest are elected by a PR method, designed to achieve or approach overall
proportionality. A second, quite different compromise consists in dividing the
electorate at large into fairly large geographically-based constituencies, within
each of which elections are held using PR. This compromise is used, for example,
in the UK in elections to the European Parliament; it has occasionally been used
in elections to the French National Assembly.
The second main dichotomy is:
ii. Deterministic Processing (DP) v Lottery Processing (LP)
Here “processing” refers to the way the votes cast are processed to produce the
outcome of the election.
I consider a voting procedure to be DP even if it does use lottery, provided this
use is confined to resolving ties, whose occurrence is extremely unlikely. Thus an
LP procedure is one that relies on lottery in a major way.
Whether use of LP is acceptable is clearly a political matter (in the broad
sense) and depends on social norms and on the purpose for which the election is
conducted. According to current social norms, it is considered in many countries
desirable to select a trial jury by lot out of a large pool of admissible candidates.
But electing a legislature by LP would probably be regarded by most people as
unacceptable. Electing an individual by lottery for a position such as chairman
of a meeting is quite common, but electing a holder of high political office by LP
would be unacceptable – although it was normal practice under Athenian democ-
racy.
3 PR procedures
Let us now see what social choice has to offer if we opt for PR.
3.1 PR&DP
The only electoral procedure that really implements this combination (as far as
possible) is the list system. To be precise, there are two variants of this system. In
2This goes back to John Stuart Mill. In [6, Ch. 7] he clearly advocates PR; but then seems to
take it for granted that electing a legislature must use some form of DR.
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the closed list variant, the seats are allocated to a party’s candidates in the order
in which they appear on its list. In the open list variant, voters may indicate pref-
erence for a particular candidate in the list of their choice, and seats are allocated
accordingly.3
The STV procedure is often claimed by politicians and journalists to be a
PR system. But social-choice theorists know very well that this claim is incorrect.
This is not only easy to prove in theory (for example, by observing that STV is not
monotonic), but can also be seen in practice by examining the results of elections
conducted under STV.4 In fact, STV is a DR system that is ingeniously designed to
produce less disproportionate outcomes than the extremely pathological plurality
procedure.5 However, the approximate degree of proportionality it produces is
quite erratic. In particular, STV is biased against small and radical parties.
3.2 PR&LP
There is one – and as far as I know only one – procedure that implements this
combination of political alternatives. It is the lottery voting procedure (LVP) pro-
posed by the American jurist and political scientist Akhil Reed Amar [1].6 This is
how it works. The entire electorate is divided into constituencies of roughly equal
size. Elections are conducted in each constituency as under the plurality system,
but with the following crucial difference. Whereas under the plurality system the
winner is the candidate with the greatest number of votes, under LVP a weighted
lottery is conducted, with candidates’ weights proportional to the respective num-
bers of votes cast for them.
Using Kolmogorov’s Strong Law of Large Numbers, it is not difficult to show
that the overall outcome under LVP is almost certain to be extremely close to
proportionality. More precisely, if the number of constituencies is fairly large (say
100 or more) then the total number of seats won by candidates representing a given
party or informal trend of opinion is very highly likely to be closely proportional
to the total number of votes cast at large for such candidates.7
This procedure shares some of the attractive political properties of both de-
terministic PR and DR.8 In fact, superficially, LVP looks like a DR procedure,
3Note however that the aggregation of all the individual preference orderings into a single
overall ordering is problematic, due to Arrow’s Theorem.
4For example, see results of elections to the Irish Da´il.
5STV is therefore advocated by people who can see the virtues of PR, but are wedded to DR
either on political grounds or because they simply take it for granted. Among the latter was J S
Mill [6, Ch. 7]; cf. footnote 2.
6It is also known, somewhat misleadingly, as the “random dictator” procedure.
7For a proof, see [5, Section 6.2].
8For a discussion of the technical properties and political advantages of this procedure, see [1]
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but this is not really so. The winner of the election in a given constituency is
not supposed to be its “best” or “most suitable” representative. In fact, her or his
primary allegiance is not to the constituency but to the party or trend of opinion
for which s/he stands. The constituency serves primarily as a subspace of the
sampling space of the electorate at large. Indeed, in principle there is no need
for the constituencies to be determined geographically; they can be quite arbitrary
sections, roughly equal in size, of the electorate at large. (However, this would
destroy some important political advantages of LVP.)
4 DR procedures
Here things will get somewhat messy. But before that, I would like to introduce a
subsidiary dichotomy, singling out a particular political principle:
iii. Majority Rule (MR) v Aggregation Rules (AR)
MR systems are based on the political view that regards majority rule as a paramount
principle. The meaning of MR is clear enough when there are just two candidates.
The straightforward natural generalization of this is Condorcet’s Principle:
If candidate x dominates candidate y (i.e., x is preferred to y by a
majority of the voters), then x is socially preferable to y.
Note that in order to apply this rule, it is not necessary in principle for a voter to
order the candidates in a (transitive) preference ordering. Only pairwise compar-
isons are needed. And a voter’s comparisons may contain cycles. (It is sometimes
claimed that cyclic preferences are irrational. I don’t find this claim persuasive.
Besides, is it politically acceptable to disqualify or ignore voters whose voting
behaviour is allegedly irrational? That would be extremely dangerous. . . .)
The alternative to MR is a mixed bag of various rules for aggregating degrees
of approval (or preference) that are assigned by the voters to each candidate. These
“degrees” may be ordinal, cardinal or of an intermediate kind (as in grading by
marks that are not merely ordinal, but are not reducible to cardinal numbers).
But in any case they require or imply at least a transitive weak ordering of the
candidates by each voter.9
Aggregation systems pose two distinct problems. First, can degrees of ap-
proval (or preference) assigned by different voters be meaningfully aggregated?
This problem is familiar in relation to utilities; but it is more general.
and [5, Section 4.4].
9A very rudimentary marking is used in the plurality and approval voting procedures, where
the only admissible marks are 0 and 1.
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Second, aggregation involves loss of information: in general, the voting pro-
file contains much more information than the outcome of the election. Arrow’s
theorem is a particular manifestation of this: it applies only to procedures that
try to aggregate ordinal preferences (preference orderings) into a single “social”
ordering. However, the problem is more general.
This loss of information can be regarded as the source of all the paradoxes
and pathologies that afflict voting procedures. I will not discuss these matters any
further, but refer you to Dan Felsenthal’s paper (Ch. 3 of this volume).
Let me just add that as far as I know the problems posed by the paradoxes and
pathologies of AR procedures arise whether we insist on deterministic processing
(that is, the combination AR&DP) or allow lottery processing (that is, AR&LP).
The situation regarding MR is different – which is the reason I have singled it
out in the subsidiary dichotomy (iii).
The combination MR&DP needs to be supplemented by some method of ag-
gregating preferences, in case a Condorcet winner does not exist. Thus we are
back to the problems raised in the case of the combination AR&DP.
This leaves the final combination:
4.1 MR&LP
For this combination, if just one candidate needs to be elected, social-choice the-
ory provides an elegant unique optimal solution, and does not need to be supple-
mented by any other political principle.
This solution is provided by a beautiful theorem, proved in 1991 by Laffond,
Laslier and Le Breton [4], and independently (using a quite different method) by
Fisher and Ryan [3].
Let me outline this theorem. Consider the following tournament game: a two-
person game in which each of two players, I and U, must nominate (independently
of each other) one member of the set X of candidates standing for election. Sup-
pose I nominates x and U nominates y. If x y (i.e., if x dominates y), then U pays
I £1; if y x, then I pays U £1; and if x= y no payment is made.
The theorem states that in this game there is a unique optimal mixed strategy.
In other words, there are unique probabilities {px : x∈ X}, with ∑x∈X px = 1, such
that if a player uses a lottery with these probabilities to nominate a candidate, then
s/he maximizes her/his expected payoff. (By symmetry, this maximal payoff is
of course 0.) Clearly, the support of this probability distribution (the set {x ∈
X : px > 0}) is a subset of the top cycle of candidates. In particular, if there
is a Condorcet winner, the optimal strategy is pure, and assigns that candidate
probability 1. Rather surprisingly, the support always consists of an odd number
of candidates.
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As pointed out by Felsenthal and Machover [2], this provides an electoral
procedure based purely on MR&LP: conduct a weighted lottery, in which each
candidate x is assigned weight px.
5 Conclusion
Much of social-choice literature is concerned with the perplexing problematics
of selecting an acceptable election procedure out of a large number of competing
ones. What I have tried to show is that if one subscribes to certain simple “grand”
political options, or a combinations of these, then social choice can provide a
single optimal procedure.
References
[1] Amar, A. R. (1984). Choosing representatives by lottery voting. Yale Law
Journal 93, 1283–1308.
[2] Felsenthal, D. S. and Machover, M. (1992). After two centuries, should Con-
dorcet’s voting procedure be implemented? Behavioral Science 37, 250–274.
[3] Fisher, D. C. and Ryan, J. (1992). Optimal strategies for a generalized ‘Scis-
sors, Paper and Stone’ game. American Mathematical Monthly 99, 935–942.
[4] Laffond, G., Laslier, J. and Le Breton, M. (1993). The bipartisan set of a
tournament. Games and Economic Behavior 5 182–201.
[5] Machover, M. (2009). Collective decision-making and supervision in a com-
munist society. Mimeograph, downloadable from http://tinyurl.com/ydfbs5z.
[6] Mill, J. S. (1861). Considerations on representative government. Download-
able from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5669
8
